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The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: 
A voiding Formalist Traps 
ROSA BROOKS • 
It always feels good to do what you're good at, and, as Sam 
Estreicher observed during an earlier session, lawyers are good at 
formalism. When we talk about the Geneva Conventions, it's 
particularly tempting to retreat into formalism, because emotions so 
easily start running high: after all, if we leave the tidy formalist world, 
we're into a messy argument about good and evil, right and wrong, 
terror and torture, cruelty and necessity. Few lawyers are good at that 
sort of conversation. 
Nonetheless, I am not making news when I say that formalism has 
limits, as well as virtues, and these limits are quite quickly reached 
when the subject is the Geneva Conventions. Let me say a bit about 
what those limits are-and what it would take to somehow move 
beyond them. 
The Geneva Conventions were drafted in 1949, in another world. The 
world of the Geneva Conventions' "framers" is still familiar to all of us, 
though increasingly it is familiar from movies and books rather from the 
evening news or, still less, our own lived experience. The world in 
which the Conventions were drafted was a world of states: powerful 
states, weak states, predatory states, law-abiding states, but states all the 
same. Soldiers wore uniforms designed by their states, carried weapons 
issued by their states, obeyed orders given by their commanders, and 
fought against the armies of other states. 
Well-most of the time, anyway. It's true that even then, there were 
actors and conflicts that didn't fit the mold. There were partisans who 
wore no uniforms and answered to no recognized authority, and 
guerillas and resistance fighters who straddled the line between civilian 
and combatant. But although it is sometimes hard to make students see 
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this, lawmaking is an imaginative enterprise: lawmakers look at the 
existing world, project onto it an image of a better, tidier world, and 
then try to develop contingency plans for dealing with various 
imaginable forms of untidiness. In this sense lawmaking is inevitably 
backward looking, because none of us is very good at correctly 
predicting future changes. 
So the diplomats who negotiated the Geneva Conventions took the 
raw materials already at hand, from the Hague Conventions and from 
international custom, and coupled these with their own searing sense of 
what had gone wrong in the world war just ended. In a sense, the 
Geneva Conventions read like an attempt to revisit the Second World 
War, without the mess, confusion, cruelty, and slaughter of civilians. 
This is not surprising. 
Inevitably, the Geneva Conventions were "out of date" from the 
moment they entered into force; they laid out rules for a world more 
orderly than the world they had inherited, and hoped that by doing so, 
they would encourage life to imitate art. 
Up to a point, it worked. The Conventions have been normatively 
important. They have led powerful states to integrate Convention rules 
into their own domestic law, and they have provided an important tool 
for shaming parties to conflicts into behaving better than they might 
otherwise. 
But the Conventions were always aspirational, and since their entry 
into force, human ingenuity has devised new and different ways to fight 
and kill. We now fear the terrorist's bomb, anthrax in the mail system, 
sabotage of critical infrastructure, or a lethal virus released deliberately 
as much as we fear an invasion by a powerful state. 
The threats we face today are not necessarily "worse" than the threats 
we used to face. It is important to emphasize this. There is no satisfying 
way to quantify the risks we face today and compare them to the risks 
we faced three or four decades ago. Yes, a "dirty bomb" in New York 
could be catastrophic, potentially killing thousands and making a major 
city uninhabitable. Is this "worse," though, than the Cold War risk of 
nuclear war? Worse than the risk of ethnic slaughter, exemplified by the 
Holocaust? 
Still, the increased threat of terrorism, though perhaps not a "worse" 
threat than any prior threat, is certainly a "different" threat in crucial 
ways. Guerillas and terrorists have always existed, and never fit neatly 
into the Geneva Conventions framework, but they operated on the 
margins until globalization scattered the tools of mass destruction 
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around the world. The hijacked airplane, the simple materials to make a 
hundred or a million IEDs, the cell-phone detonators, the viruses in test-
tubes: these are new. Globalization has turned the marginal, nuisance 
threat of terrorism into a threat that even powerful states must take 
seriously. 
Even in powerful states, intelligence services, militaries and laws all 
evolved to handle "traditional" conflicts and traditional threats from 
belligerent foreign states. Yet terrorists-like other non-state actors-
are, by definition, not party to the Geneva Convention. They play by a 
different set of rules-if indeed there is any set of rules they follow. 
As a result, the formal framework of the Geneva Conventions does 
not fit the struggle against terrorism well. Too many of its threshold 
distinctions are premised on the continued existence of a rapidly 
----~-L~.-- ------1..1 vaJusuiug wunu. 
The Geneva Conventions take it for granted, for instance, that we can 
draw meaningful spatial distinctions between zones of conflict and 
zones of peace, but this breaks down when the enemy is a 
geographically diffuse terrorist network, neither confined to one state 
nor interested in controlling territory. If al Qaeda has a secret cell in 
Yemen--or in Germany, or in the United States-from which it plans 
and trains for terrorist attacks, is Yemen (or Germany, or the United 
States) in a conflict zone? The Geneva Conventions offer no way to 
answer this question. 
Temporal boundaries between war and peace, as well as spatial 
boundaries, are challenged by the rise of non-state actors. The Geneva 
Conventions assume a world in which diplomacy and negotiations can 
bring an end to a conflict, but with loosely organized terrorist 
organizations, there is often no one with whom one could negotiate, and 
no one with the authority to bring about a peace. Attacks may be 
constant, or intermittent, and the Geneva Conventions don't offer 
helpful standards for determining when a conflict begins or ends in the 
absence of agreements between parties to the conflict. 
Most troublingly, given recent events, the Geneva Conventions don't 
offer satisfying answers to the question of which people are entitled to 
benefit from its protections. On the one hand, the text is clear that the 
Conventions apply only to "High Contracting Parties," which, by 
definition, are states. 1 On the other hand, we have Common Article 3,2 
I. E.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 
1, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 136 [hereinafter GPW]. 
2. E.g., id. art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136-38. 
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which may-or may not-be taken to apply to all parties to all conflicts 
not otherwise covered, regardless of nationality and state allegiance. 
And even when we're confident that the Conventions apply to a conflict 
within a territory, what do we do about combatants who wear no 
uniforms, or don't appear to work within a traditional military command 
structure? A strict reading of the Geneva Conventions suggests that the 
Bush Administration is not unjustified in its claim that neither al Qaeda 
nor Taliban detainees captured in Afghanistan are entitled to prisoner of 
war status. 
I have written extensively about these issues elsewhere, so I won't 
run through additional examples here. 3 The point is that an entirely 
formalist read of the Geneva Conventions leads to the conclusion that 
the Conventions just aren't applicable, for the most part, to the "war on 
terror." 
To human rights advocates (of whom I am one), this is an unpalatable 
conclusion, for it appears to suggest that there are virtually no rules of 
international law governing how the war on terror is waged. It suggests 
that the United States is legally entitled to offer few or no protections-
procedural or substantive-to those it suspects of being terrorists, and in 
fact can treat suspected terrorists in a manner that would be clearly 
illegal in both a domestic criminal context and in a traditional armed 
conflict context. 
Most rights advocates adopt one of two strategies in reaction to this 
dilemma. The first strategy consists of agreeing that a formalist read of 
the Geneva Conventions makes them hard to apply to terrorism, but 
shrugging this off on the grounds that terrorism is not a form of armed 
conflict at all, and is merely criminal activity. Obviously, if terrorism is 
simply a form of crime, and not a form of armed conflict, it is subject 
not to the Geneva Conventions but to domestic criminal and 
constitutional law, which offer relatively robust protections for suspects. 
The second strategy employed by many rights advocates consists of 
what one could call "modified formalism": it consists of accepting that 
terrorism is a form of armed conflict, but arguing that the Geneva 
Conventions should be interpreted less like a statute than a constitution. 
That is, a treaty should be interpreted according to its "spirit" and 
according to the "intent" of its framers, which in this case was to protect 
fundamental human rights during armed conflicts. A modified version 
of this argument is that some of the substantive aspects of the Geneva 
3. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of 
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675 (2004). 
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Conventions are customary law, and that customary law imposes 
additional obligations on detaining powers beyond those outlined in the 
Conventions. Both variants of this theory can then be used to justify 
demanding POW-like protections even for those detainees who most 
clearly lack any entitlement to them on a strict formalist reading of the 
Conventions. 
Neither approach overcomes the problems I have discussed. The first 
has a head-in-the-sand quality, since international terrorism is different 
from ordinary crime in significant and obvious ways, and it seems clear 
that traditional criminal investigations and trials are not an adequate 
means of combating terrorists who seek to cause mass death and who 
operate in many different countries. For the most part, serious rights 
advocates have abandoned this line of argument, and acknowledged that 
at least some of the time, if not all of the time, the activities of terrorisl 
groups look more like armed conflict than crime. 
The second approach is better, but it is also problematic. First, it 
raises unresolved questions about treaty interpretation. There is no clear 
legal basis for insisting that the Geneva Conventions be read according 
to their "spirit" rather than their letter, and in any case it is far from 
clear that the framers of the Convention would have chosen to accord 
terrorists most of the rights given to POWs, had they foreseen 
international terrorism of the sort we now face. There is also little 
consensus about which aspects of the Geneva Conventions reflect (or 
have become) binding customary international law. Certainly core 
provisions, such as those that prohibit the intentional targeting of 
civilians, reflect customary international law-but more subtle 
questions of due process are less easily resolved by reference to custom. 
This means, among other things, that Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales was not wrong when, during his days as White House 
Counsel, he advised President Bush that some provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions seem "quaint" or even "obsolete" when applied to 
terrorists. 4 
It is difficult-almost impossible-to advance this proposition 
without generating enormous opposition from most rights advocates, 
but I think that the opposition is knee-jerk and misplaced. 
Acknowledging that the Bush Administration's read of the Geneva 
Conventions is not implausible does not require agreement with the 
Administration's policies. It is entirely possible to accept that the 
4. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, White House Counsel, to the President (Jan. 25, 
2002). 
202 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 46:1 
Geneva Conventions don't apply to terrorist suspects, but still consider 
the Administration's detention and interrogation policies both morally 
bankrupt and strategically foolish. 
The Geneva Conventions should not be sacralized. They are 
important, relevant, and often useful. But if we resist Bush 
Administration policies by treating the Geneva Conventions as sacred 
cows, we do the long-term cause of promoting human rights a 
disservice. The Conventions are not perfect-how could they be? They 
are the product of a time and a place, of divisive negotiations between 
human beings who sought to represent the interests of their states. 
Indeed, before the "war on terror" rallied rights advocates around the 
Conventions, some in the human rights community were themselves 
attacking the Convention framework for its inadequacies, arguing that 
the Geneva Conventions actually legitimize (and-by implication-can 
worsen) the violence of states. These are important critiques, and we 
need to clear enough intellectual space to have them. 
The only way to do that is to stop treating the Geneva Conventions as 
our sole or most crucial point of reference. To be sure, the Geneva 
Conventions are the law we've got, so it is useful to ask what the 
Geneva Conventions require, what they permit, and what issues they 
just don't address; it's also useful to identify areas of consensus and 
discord about how and when they are applicable. But if we value the 
rule of law, this needs to be done in an honest and disinterested way. 
This means facing up to it when the Conventions are silent or seem 
archaic, and acknowledging it when the questions we face are primarily 
policy questions, not legal questions. 
In practice, this does not happen much. In the debate about post-9111 
U.S. practices, few of the participants are willing to move beyond 
formalism or faux formalism of one sort or another. As I suggested at 
the beginning, perhaps this is because we find the policy discussions too 
difficult and emotional. But it is dangerous to avoid them. 
When we refuse to admit the limits of formalism, we inevitably have 
to start stretching rules and ordinary meanings. And if rights advocates 
adopt a rigid formalism, it becomes difficult to focus clearly on 
important differences between various Administration arguments, which 
in tum makes it hard to develop effective rejoinders. 
Take three different examples. 
First, consider the Bush Administration's decision to deny POW 
status to Taliban detainees. As noted above, a strict formalist read of the 
Geneva Conventions makes the Administration's decision seem 
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perfectly plausible, though hardly inevitable. It would be possible to 
argue that the Administration was just wrong, however, either on the 
facts or on the law; one could argue, for instance, that most Taliban 
soldiers wore distinctive emblems and otherwise met Geneva 
requirements, or that at any rate some did, and therefore individualized 
status hearings were required. 
Second, consider the Administration's arguments relating to torture, 
contained in the Bybee Memo of August 1, 2002, which concluded that 
under federal law, "torture" must involve only the sort of pain 
associated with organ failure and death. 5 The response here would be 
that Administration lawyers were not simply mistaken about the 
conclusions warranted by statute, treaty, and case law, but that they 
were engaging in illegitimate and arguably unethical forms of legal 
arguntentation, ignoiing and selecti\'elj' misreading various relevant 
texts in order to reach a predetermined conclusion. 
Third, consider the arguments, also in the Bybee memo, claiming that 
the President has the inherent constitutional power to override 
conflicting federal law when he deems it necessary.6 These arguments 
are legal in their form-they rely on the President's commander in chief 
powers-but their implications go beyond law, insofar as they assert, in 
some fundamental sense, that political power is simply beyond law's 
reach. 
In each of these three cases, Administration arguments are couched in 
the language of formalism. Everyone wants the law on their side, so this 
is understandable. But the kinds of arguments are fundamentally 
different. 
Think of law-of the enterprise of legal interpretation-as a game, 
like basketball or tennis. The game of legal interpretation has rules, 
some written, some customary, some bright-line, some ambiguous. But 
although it is difficult to say just what elements make tennis tennis, we 
all know that there is a difference between playing tennis in a way that 
pushes the envelope between the permissible and the impermissible, 
cheating, and leaving the game. Thus: calling a ball "in" when it just 
touches the outside of the baseline is skirting the edge of the 
permissible, but it is clearly within the rule. Calling a ball "in" when 
one knows it to have landed outside the baseline is cheating, but it is 
still playing tennis: it is just cheating at tennis. Pausing to beat up one's 
5. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto Gonzales, 
Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002). 
6. !d. 
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opponent when he objects to cheating is no longer tennis, however; the 
resort to force destroys the game entirely. 
Map this onto the three different Administration arguments I 
mentioned above. The Bush administration claim that Taliban detainees 
are not entitled to POW status or individualized hearings on the 
question may be wrongheaded in a strategic or moral sense. But if we 
think of law as a game, the Administration is clearly playing by the 
rules here, though perhaps pushing boundaries a bit. 
The claim about torture relies on cheating, insofar as it depends on 
selective and misleading citation and odd logical leaps. Nonetheless, 
cheating, however reprehensible, is a way to play the game; by 
definition, if you are cheating at a game you are still accepting most 
aspects of the game itself. 
But the claim about inherent executive powers is of a different order. 
Though couched in formalist terms, it's a game-ending move, the rough 
equivalent of a threat: "Play by my rules or I'll crush you." 
Although law is "gamelike" in many respects, it is, of course, 
crucially different from tennis. The "rules" of law and legal 
interpretation are not there for the entertainment of the players; they're 
not merely self-referential. Law is supposed to bear some relation to 
facts on the ground, and law enables coercive action to be taken in ways 
that alter the facts on the ground. If we create a legal system in which 
cheating is widespread--or, worse, if we overlook game-ending moves 
and treat them as legitimate modifications of the game-then it isn't 
merely rules that get bent, but the rule of law altogether. 
This is what makes it so important to move beyond the sacralization 
of the Geneva Conventions to a more particularized discussion of just 
what morality and strategy require. As long as we insist that the Geneva 
Conventions and related law and custom set the terms of the debate 
about post-9/11 U.S. actions, we create strong incentives for players to 
push the envelope, cheat, and even go outside the law altogether in one 
way or another. This dangerously weakens the rule of law. 
The Geneva Conventions-what they permit, what they require, and 
what they do not reach-should thus be the beginning of the discussion, 
not the end. If we're serious about both rights and security, we should 
make an effort to get back to basics: what sort of world do we want to 
live in? Knowing that terrorism will persist, and that technological 
development will continue to give tools of mass destruction to non-state 
actors, what principles ought to govern how terrorist suspects are 
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treated, and how states respond to real or perceived threats from 
terrorists? 
This requires thinking both about morality and about strategy. And 
the process, if taken seriously, might help break through impasses and 
allow us to identify areas of agreement that are obscured when the 
Geneva Conventions dictate the terms of debate. 
Imagine, for instance, that we live in the "all security, all the time" 
world, in which collective physical security always outweighs 
individual rights. There is no free expression, no freedom of movement, 
no right to due process. None of us would want to inhabit so totalitarian 
a state-and most of us would wonder, in any case, if "perfect" security 
is even a realistic goal. We do not strive for "perfect" road safety, 
because we value convenience, speed, and a relatively low level of state 
monitoring, and because '.Ve probably could not achieve perfect safety in 
any case. Security from terrorist threats is not inherently different; at 
some point one realizes diminishing returns on further rights 
restrictions. 
Of course, few of us would want to inhabit an "all rights, all the time" 
state either, one in which state authorities entirely lacked the power to 
adapt law and policy to meet new kinds of threats if doing so meant 
longer detentions or more limited due process rights. 
Imagining an "all security, all the time" world versus an "all rights, 
all the time" world helps get us past the tendency to assume that 
security must trump rights or rights must trump security, and recasts the 
questions as one about precisely which tradeoffs are worthwhile. But 
even this is still a bit misleading, since conceptualizing the debate in 
terms of a tradeoff between rights and security obscures the 
possibility-indeed, the strong likelihood-that "security" and "rights" 
are causally linked. 
That is: it is quite possible that some rights-restricting U.S. actions in 
the war on terror have actually increased the terrorist threat against the 
United States. Our policy of open-ended detentions at Guantanamo, for 
instance, justified by the Bush Administration on security grounds, has 
alienated even many of our allies. Accept, for the sake of the argument, 
that at least most, if not all, of the Guantanamo detainees are dangerous 
terrorists who, if released, will continue their efforts to attack the United 
States in some way. A level-headed policy maker needs to take this 
prospect seriously, and critics of Guantanamo Bay should not assume 
that all detainees are innocent or harmless. But a level-headed policy 
maker should also take into account the externalities of Guantanamo. 
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These are difficult to measure, but might include some or all of the 
following: greater difficulties in persuading "friendly" states to share 
intelligence information, greater difficulties in persuading ordinary 
people in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to trust U.S. forces and share 
information; and greater difficulty discouraging some from actively 
supporting al Qaeda and other anti-U.S. organizations. 
All these externalities create new security risks that must be 
evaluated alongside the risks of releasing potentially dangerous 
terrorists. Note, too, that the "moral" and "strategic" arguments prove to 
be intertwined. Regardless of how U.S. policy makers view the morality 
of open-ended detentions, they may have serious costs to the United 
States as long as many others view them as immoral. 
Of course, one can, and should, turn this around as well. High levels 
of physical insecurity make the enjoyment of other human rights 
difficult or impossible, and terrorism is itself a human rights violation of 
enormous magnitude. If a rigid insistence on procedural due process 
rights for terror suspects led to a massive increase in catastrophic 
terrorist attacks, we would not be better off. The often-repeated claim 
that it is our very openness that makes us vulnerable is not entirely 
frivolous. 
All this implies, I think, that we need to evaluate the various kinds of 
threats and potential responses with some specificity. Certain 
restrictions on rights-limited in duration-might well be justifiable in 
the face of an imminent catastrophic threat (nuclear weapons, for 
instance). But the phrase "the war on terrorism" lumps together, by 
implication, a wide range of different threats, most of which would not 
justify serious restrictions on rights. The captured Taliban soldier, for 
instance, however resolutely anti-American, will probably do the United 
States no great harm if released-even if he promptly rejoins the 
Taliban. Osama bin Laden, if captured, would present a different story. 
Similarly, if we are concerned about biological attacks on the United 
States, it may be that massive investments in our dysfunctional public 
health system are a more effective response to this threat than 
weakening norms against torture through the use of various "coercive" 
interrogation techniques. 
It's beyond the scope of this short essay to discuss concrete means of 
dealing with the variety of security threats we now face. My point is that 
we need to walk back from the panicky, post-9111 sense that anything 
goes in the name of fighting terrorism. We need to develop responses to 
terrorism that are nuanced and proportionate, and acknowledge both that 
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the varying forms of terrorism do not pose equal threats and that every 
response has costs of its own. 
That will be a monumental undertaking, but not a hopeless 
undertaking. The work of several of the participants in this conference 
makes valuable contributions to the project I have outlined. To some 
extent, we're facing empirical questions: how severe are the various 
threats, and what can be done about each? Lawyers may be good at 
formalism, but increasingly, many of us are also good at making cost-
benefit analyses, and a bit more of this would be useful here. So too 
would be looking to the experience of other nations that have addressed 
terrorist threats through domestic legislation. While other nations have 
at times restricted certain rights to combat terrorism, none have found it 
necessary to tum to torture or indefinite detention. It seems likely that 
we could learn from a careful study of the effectiveness of different 
domestic legal regimes. 
Paul Stephan opened this conference by asking, "Who owns the 
Geneva Conventions? Who gets to say what is in them, and should be in 
them?" My answer, on some level, is: why not us? Why not begin the 
process of imaging a new law of armed conflict, and new domestic 
laws, right here and right now? 
It's easy to respond that this is too hard, and will take too long, and 
opens up too many cans of worms. But this is a cop-out. It may be a 
hard, long, and divisive process, but we certainly won't be able to 
develop a new consensus if we don't try. 
